Involvement of Military in politics or running the state is not considered appropriate for democracy. However it is common phenomena in developing countries, where democracy has not taken root due to lack of sincere and capable political leadership  or unnecessary involvement of military in politics. Rule and governance is an art which any Tom Dick or Harry having plenty of money to get elected cannot perform. Such people take politics as a business to spend money to make more money.  The result is a crisis and the military as an organised body have to undertake the responsibility for which they neither have training nor knowledge. However due to their administrative control and initial sincerity of purpose, the situation get stabilized, thereafter instead of handing over the reins of power to whom it belongs, they continue their involvement overtly or covertly. After some time there is a mess because despite all the sincerity they cant handle the civil job for which they have not training or expertise.  Again they have to leave it to the politicians. The cycle keeps repeating. Neither the politicians learn from their mistakes nor the military, because it is taboo to discuss this subject pragmatically, mere condemnation is closing eyes to the reality. 

Also read:

1. 1948 War
2. 1965 War
3. 1971 War
4. Siachin
5. Chumik Opertion
6. Kargil …
7. Pulwama 2019
8. Pak Army Budget….  / (2) فوجی بجٹ…

There is a need to take this “Milpolitik” as a subject, so that the politicians and the military learn to function in their own spheres, however if the military interventions becomes inevitable then both should understand strengths and limitations of each other and keep military involvement to the minimum to make their smooth exit possible. Time has proved that the constitution and law does not deter the military not to intervene once the existence of a state is threatened. Military involvement in politic under ideal conditions is like a poison, but under adverse conditions it acts like an antidote to political disease. Like the poison, kills but once used carefully in small quantity under prescription of a specialist doctor, the pharmacists convert the poison in to medicine to save lives. Prolong use of such medicine with poisonous contents is not advised as it will be counterproductive putting life of patient in danger. Similarly the military involvement in political affairs’ be avoided but if unavoidable then must be within limits and safeguards from negative fall out to state, system and the important institution people love from the core of their hearts. The military not only defend the state and citizens from foreign aggression but also internally from terrorists and in Hybrid War. Thus military must be kept strong and professional to undertake its primary mission without any hindrance or diversion.

Caution! Any effort to weaken, undermine Pak Military on political grounds will be a recipe for disaster. There are examples of Libya, Syria, Yemen, Sudan and many African countries. The institution is well informed and takes appropriate measures in the best interest of the country, which at times may not be well understood or well received publicly. The confidential information can not be made public, hence misunderstandings should be avoided through positive approach and confidence. Any criticism be kept within limits with positive and sincere intentions to improve and not to undermine their sacrifices. Enemy look for such opportunities for exploitations.

This is the first time that the term “Milpolitik” is being used to introduce this new discipline among the academics, student and public. it should benefit the politicians and the military with positive results. The scientific approach in understanding each other would reduce tension, restore confidence and strengthen all institutions and  pillars of state.

Milpolitik Philosophy

The word Milpolitik have been coined* from German Militärpolitik , for Military Politics. According to Encyclopaedia Britannica;  Realpolitik Political Philosophy, is “The realpolitik, politics based on practical objectives rather than on ideals. The word does not mean “real” in the English sense but rather connotes “things”—hence a politics of adaptation to things as they are. Realpolitik thus suggests a pragmatic, no-nonsense view and a disregard for ethical considerations. In diplomacy it is often associated with relentless, though realistic, pursuit of the national interest.”

“Milpolitik” is a pragmatic approach in dealing with military involvement in politics and a disregard for ethical considerations often associated with relentless, though realistic, pursuit of the national interest.”

Civil Military Relations
Dr. Isharat Hussain writes; Pakistan represents a civil-military hybrid where an elected civilian government rules but it cannot command the political system to the exclusion of the top military brass, which exercises clout over policymaking from the sidelines.
Governance involves balancing the imperatives of paniciparory democracy and good governance with the pressures of national security.
External security pressures and internal political and social incohcrencies, rampant extremism and an incessant use of violence by compcting politico-religious interests. Periodic civilian demands on the military to undertake tasks outside of its professional domain to aid civilians leads to a leadership crisis resulting in incoherence and inaction and personal preferences of the rulers.
As past experience shows, when politicians run to (he army chief for help, it upsets the balance of civilian system of government and eventually brings the army in to power. Even Ayub Khan, the army man, learnt this lesson to his discomfiture.

As did Z. A. Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. If this cycle of a civilian incerregnum followed by a period of military rule is to come to an end in Pakistan, the civilian politicians have to play their pan faithfully and in national interest. If they do, then the army may play its part too and Pakistan may break out of this vicious cycle that has kept it from developing inca a true democracy and a truly progressive nation.
Excerpts: “Governing the Un-Governable” by Dr. Ishrat Hussain 
Analysis
However it is the 1st time that the military top appears to be standing with convicted, corrupt politicians [Denied by ISPR, repeatedly, that military is not involved  in political matters and that it is totally neutral]. This perception, right or wrong, has  tarnished the image of military, which took them years to build. They must take appropriate measures to remove this perception lest the people loose confidence on the last stable institution. Military must help to build the civil political institutions rather than downplaying or undermining. How long the country can continue in such state of affairs? Haven’t we learnt lessons from loss of one half?

Flawed national and operational strategy proved to; be disastrous for Pakistan , both politically and militarily. Power, national and operational strategy, the methodology of crisis and conflict management and higher direction of war in which we had been found wanting in 1971. [Pakistan Army Web Porta]

DISCLAIMER!

1. The information shared here is Unclassified, available, obtained from public resources.
2. War history from Pak Army official Web portal https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/War-History.php
3. We do not represent the Pakistan Army, Defence Forces  or any other government department.
4. Views expressed here are private which are not final. 

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Milpolitik

Prevalent Environments 

The present messy situation  has shattered the confidence of people in the System, the top leadership. Repeat of 1971, performance in any major National Crisis cannot be ruled out. The fiasco in National policy, strategic planning & conduct was the reason for the doom, while at the tactical level even the enemy was forced to appreciate and admire the resilience, heroism, devotion & sacrifices of the Pakistan Army.

Now is the era of multi facet Hybrid War,, weakening or controlling the political & economic power can best serve the heinous designs of the enemy. The USSR’s Nuclear arsenal could not save it from disintegration. The Russia-Ukraine conflict remains conventional, though Russia is a big nuclear power. It is up to the Nation to avert  the impending catastrophe or keep watching as spectators! We need to look back at our history to learn some lessons.

Historic Background

Independence was gained, the state of Pakistan was established with its two wings East and West Pakistan in 1947, one thousand  miles apart. This was only possible after a lot of struggle and sacrifices but just after 24 years, East Pakistan was lost, due to negligence and incompetence of leadership. Many studies have been conducted, books and articles written during the half century of this debacle. Justice Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report is comprehensive but remained classified for long, however some of its contents are now publicly available, which throws light on what went wrong? The lessons of 71 war must always be kept in view if Pakistan has to survive and progress, we should not forget blunders committed in the past, not to repeat it again. History is ruthless and the nations which do not learn lessons from the past get perished and become history. Allah says:

“God does not change the condition of a people’s lot, unless they change what is in their hearts”. (Quran; 13:11)

The debacle of East Pakistan did not develop overnight. Separation of Pakistan involves various factors, like involvement of foreign hands, economic disparity, geographical and socio-cultural differences. There is a long list of Causes of Separation of East Pakistan, some are:

1. The Geographical and Socio-Cultural Differences
2. Economic Causes 
3. Education and Hindu Domination
4. The Language issues
5. Disparity in Development , Planning
6. Disparity in Civil Services and Armed Forces.
7. Differences over Constitution Making
8. Rise of Regional Bengali Parties.
9. Effects of the 1970 Cyclone
10. Results of 1970 Elections. 
11. Not capitalising on Ideology of Pakistan

However here focus is on the role played by the military in this tragedy and how it is related to the crisis in 2022.  Information below about conduct of war has been taken from the Pakistan Army official website, War History section.

.

Brief War History 1971 Indo-Pak War 

With 1971 commenced the most tragic year of Pak history. Failing to resolve a political problem by political means, a Martial Law regime, manipulated by some megalomaniac politicians, resorted to military action in East Pakistan on night 25/26 March. Widespread insurgency broke out. Personnel of two infantry divisions and Civil Armed Forces with weapons were airlifted in Pakistan International Airlines planes, over-flying about 5000 miles non stop via Sri Lanka in the first week of April 1971 – the longest operational air move by Pakistan Army.[1]

By May near normalcy had been restored, thanks to the fast reaction, dedication and cool courage of our soldiers, sailors and airmen operating in a hostile environment under adverse climatic and terrain conditions, without adequate logistics and medical support.

Indian Concentration of Force Superiority

Indian Army

India’s immoral covert armed intervention had failed; by October it had concentrated four times our strength in over 12 divisions (400,000 troops) supported by five regiments of tanks, and about 50,000 (Mukti Bahni Terrorists) trained and equipped by Indian Army. The Pakistan Army had 55000 Army troops.  [Ratio,  450000:55000 / 450:55]

(If the logistic personnel are excluded, the actual Pak Army fighting force facing the enemies was around 34000 troops. Indian Chief FM Manak Shaw admitted that One Pakistani Soldier was faced with 50 Indians soldiers.)

Indian Navy

The Indian Navy’s one aircraft carrier, eight destroyers/frigates, two submarines and three landing crafts, against Pak Navy’s four gunboats, eight Chinese coasters and two landing craft supported them. 

Indian Air Force

Eleven Indian Air Force squadrons – 4 Hunter, 1 SU-7, 3 Gnat and 3 MiG 21 – from five airfields around East Pakistan faced our one valiant Number 14 squadron of F-86 Sabres based on a single airfield around Dhaka . [Ratio 11:1]

21 November, on Eid day, whenPak  fatigued soldiers had been operating in the most hostile environment for almost ten months, including a month of fasting, the Indian army felt emboldened enough to launch a full scale invasion at over twenty fronts in the east, west and north of East Pakistan . 

Indian Divisions attacked Pak brigade positions; brigades attacked Pak battalion, company and platoon positions, supported by their armour, artillery and air force. 

Till 16 December 1971 Indians could not capture except one Town, not defended not to strategic reasons

When most of Pak defensive positions, rooted to the ground, could not be overrun, Indian forces after suffering heavy casualties resorted to outflanking moves. The aggressors could not capture till the cease-fire; on 16 December, a single town except Jessore, which was not defended for strategic reasons. 

For the Pakistani soldiers, this was their finest hour fighting against heavy odds with their backs to the wall inflicting heavy casualties, bloodied but unbowed when an Indian commander, through a messenger asked for our Jamalpur battalion to surrender, encircled by two brigades, the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sultan Ahmad, Sitara-i-Juraat of 31 Baloch replied in a message wrapped around a bullet which read, “I want to tell you that the fighting you have seen so far is very little; in fact the fighting has not even started. So let us stop negotiating and start the fight.” 

Similarly 4 Frontier Force, under 205 Brigade (Brigadier Tajammul Malik), held out at Hilli for 19 days against 6 battalions, inflicting heavy casualties, till withdrawal on 11 December, after getting outflanked. 

Similar hard fought actions took place at Bahaduria and elsewhere by Punjab, Baloch, Frontier Force and Azad Kashmir units all arms and services, and Civil Armed Forces including West Pakistan Rangers and police units. 107 Brigades (Brigadier Mohammad Hayat, Sitara-i-Juraat) held at bay an Indian division of 5 brigades and 2 armour regiments at Khulna inflicting heavy casualties till 17 December and ceased fighting only after repeated orders of our Eastern Command.

West Pakistan

On the West Pakistan front, on 3 December 1971 , India attacked with the main effort against the Shakargarh sector with three infantry divisions supported by three armoured brigades against our number 8 Division front, operating under our 1 Corps (Commander Lieutenant General Irshad Ahmad Khan). The attack was halted in the tracks, inflicting heavy casualties. Number 8 (Independent) Armoured Brigade (Brigadier Mohammad Ahmed, Sitara-i-Juraat) effectively blocked and destroyed enemy penetration of Pak minefield and saved Zafarwal from being outflanked by Indian armour.

Jammu and Kashmir

In Jammu and Kashmir , Chhamb, Lahore , Kasur, Sulemanki and Rajasthan sectors, war was carried into Indian territory , with success at some points, not so successfully at others due to inadequate forces and air support. 

For the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force, this conflict was their finest hour fighting against overwhelming odds in both wings of the country raged with full fury.

Cease-Fire 

Before our counter offensive could be launched in West Pakistan , India asked for cease-fire in the United Nations. 

The Ghazis and Shaheeds proved in their supreme hour of trial all the military virtues of Faith, Honour, Valour, Fortitude, Endurance, Loyalty, Group Cohesion and Unlimited Liability, and above all, the spirit of “Jehad”.

On 4 December 1971 , the United States moved a draft resolution calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of Indian forces, which was vetoed by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Thereafter, another six resolutions including one by China were introduced calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of forces, some of which were accepted by Pakistan. However, due to behind the scene political machinations by India and her allies, their passage and implementation was stalled till Dhaka fell on 16 December 1971 and the cease-fire had been perfidiously converted to surrender.” I took a careful look at the documents and was aghast to see the heading – which read Instrument of ‘Surrender’……” writes Lieutenant General J.F.R.Jacob, Chief of Staff, Indian, Eastern Army. (Lieutenant General J.F.R.Jacob, “Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation).

Also read: 

• “Blood over Different Shades of Green” Book by Ikram Sehgal, Bettina Robotka-  Reviewed by Haider Mehdi
• “A Summary Assessment of the 1971 Military Debacle” by By Kaiser Tufail

How many PoWs ?

Pak Army had a Headquarter Eastern Command and two infantry divisions and some ad hoc arrangements.  Army uniform personnel:  55,692,  Paramilitary 16,354,  Police 5,296, Navy 1000 and PAF 800, total uniformed: 79,676, moreover some of their East Pakistani collaborators and civilians making a total of approximately 93,000 prisoners of war.

FM Sam Manekshaw Indian Army Chief

In an interview with BBC, FM Sam Manekshaw was asked did you won the 1971 war because Pakistan Army was incompetent. Manekshaw replied no, instead he said that the Pakistan Army deployed in East Pakistan fought gallantly.

He also added that circumstances were not in favour of the Pakistan Army as they were 1000 miles away from their bases. Also, the number of Indian soldiers deployed to fight East Pakistan surpassed the number of Pakistani soldiers in East Pakistan, each Pakistani soldier was facing at least 50 Indian soldiers.

Lieutenant-General Yaqub Khan Opposed Military Action

In 1969, Lieutenant-General Yaqub Khan was posted to East Pakistan as the commander of Eastern Command in Dacca by President Yahya Khan and helped evaluate the command rotation of the Eastern military.:  Soon, he was appointed as Governor of East Pakistan where he began learning the Bengali language and became accustomed to Bengali culture.:  He was highly respected by the East Pakistani military officers due to his stance and professionalism and was said to be very well liked and respected in the East. [9]

He was known to be an unusual military officer who knew very well about “limits of force”, and did not believe in the use of brute force to settle political disputes. In 1969–71, he worked together with Admiral Ahsan in advising the Yahya administration in an effort to resolve the situation and strictly restricted the proposal of usage of military force in the province.

At the cabinet meeting, he was often fierce and strictly resisted the usage of military option but was respected in the military due to his understanding of Bengali issues and whose colleagues often labeled him as “Bingos.” In 1970, he notably coordinated the relief operations when the disastrous cyclone had hit the state and gained prestige for his efforts in the country.

In 1971, he participated in the area contingency and fact-finding mission, which was known as the Ahsan–Yaqub Mission, to resolve the political deadlock between East Pakistan and Pakistan as both men argued that “military measures would not change the political situations”.

Yaqub Resigns 

In March 1971, he became aware of the rumors of a military action against East Pakistanis and delivered desperate military signals to President Yahya Khan in Islamabad to not use military solution as he feared Indian intervention. After the resignation of Admiral Ahsan, he was ordered to use military force against the civil agitation led by the Awami League but refused to take this order and tendered his resignation to be posted back to Pakistan. His resignation came in the light of resisting the military orders and fiercely maintained to President Yahya that “military solution was not acceptable”.

Commenting on the situation, Yaqub maintained that: “[President] Yahya was also keen to impose the “open sword” martial law to roll back the situation as it was in 1969.” He lodged a strong protest against the military solution and maintained that the “central government had failed to listen to the voices of their co-citizens in the East.” To many authors, Yaqub Khan had become a “conscientious objector” in the military.

He was posted back to Pakistan, joined the Army GHQ staff and participated in the winter war against India in 1971 without commanding an assignment and retired from the military after the war, also in 1971.

Justice Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report

The Hamoodur Rahman Commission (otherwise known as War Enquiry Commission), was a judicial inquiry commission that assessed Pakistan’s political–military involvement in East-Pakistan from 1947 to 1971.The commission was set up on 26 December 1971 by the Government of Pakistan and chaired under Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman. Constituted “to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the atrocities and 1971 war”, including the “circumstances in which the Commander of the Eastern Military Command, surrendered the Eastern contingent forces under his command laid down their arms.” The commission’s final report was very lengthy and provided an analysis based on extensive interviews and testimonies. Its primary conclusion was very critical of the role of Pakistan’s military interference, the misconduct of politicians as well as the intelligence failures of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), which permitted the infiltration of Indian agents all along the borders of East Pakistan. Originally, there were 12 copies of the report. These were all destroyed; except the one that was handed over to the Government who disallowed its publication at the time. In 2000, parts of the commission report were leaked to Indian and Pakistani newspapers.

The full report was thought to be declassified by the government in 2000, along with other reports concerning the year 1971. However, it was reported that the supplementary report based on testimonies of POWs was published, and the key portion of the report concerning the political and military issues remained classified and marked as “Top Secret.”

Findings

The main findings of Hamood ur Rehman report are:

1. The report accused the army generals of what it called a “premature surrender” and said the military’s continued involvement in running the government after 1958 was one reason for the corruption and ineffectiveness of senior officers. 
2. The report maintained that: “Even responsible service officers have asserted before us that because of corruption resulting from such involvement, the lust for wine and women and greed for lands and houses, a large number of senior army officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had lost not only their will to fight but also their professional competence.”
3. The report said Pakistan’s military ruler at the time, General Yahya Khan, who stepped down after Pakistan’s defeat in December 1971, “permitted and even instigated” the surrender, and it recommended that he be publicly tried along with other senior military colleagues.
4. The report accused General Yahya Khan of being a womanizer and an alcoholic. According to the report “Firm and proper action would not only satisfy the nation’s demand for punishment where it is deserved but would also ensure against any recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the 1971 war”.

Recommendations

Many insightful recommendations were made by the commission as it recommends: 

1. 1. To hold the public trial for the President General Yahya Khan, also the Commander-in-Chief and the chief martial law administrator of both East and Pakistan in western side.
   2. The Commission found suitable for field Courts-martial for Lieutenant-General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lieutenant-General Gul Hasan, Lieutenant-General SSGM Prizada and Major-General Khudadad Khan, and Major-General A. O. Mitha should be publicly tried for being party to a criminal conspiracy to illegally usurp power from Mohammad Ayub Khan in power if necessary by the use of force.
   3. Five additional Lieutenant-Generals and three Brigadier-Generals were recommended to be tried for willful neglect of duty. These were Lieutenant-Generals included A.A.K. Nazi, Mohammad Jamshed, M. Rahim Khan, Irshad Ahmad Khan, B.M. Mustafa and Brigadier-Generals G.M. Baquir Siddiqui, Mohammad Hayat and Mohammad Aslam Niazi.
   4. According to the Commission General Mustafa’s offensive plan aimed at the capture of the Indian position of Ramgarh in the Rajasthan area (Western Front) was militarily unsound and haphazardly planned, and its execution resulted in severe loss of vehicles and equipment in the desert.
   5. In the supplementary report section in “Higher Direction of War act” of the HRC report, it strongly called for the establishment of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) mechanism with headquartered in MoD. Per the act, the JCSC composed of a chairman, the Chief of Naval Staff, the Chief of Army Staff, and the Chief of Air Staff. It was mandated to have a collective responsibility of national defence and mechanism of plans based on joint objectives.
   6. The chairmanship was to be rotated between each inter-services, irrespective of the personal ranks in each service.The commission also stressed for the need of stronger deterrence of the country against the foreign intrusions and makes more thoughtful recommendations about the defense of the country as a whole.
   7. The Commission called for restoring the rule of law according to the Constitution and establishing the writ of government through the Constitution.

In the end, the commission opined in the report that the nation would learn the necessary lessons from these tragic events and that effective and early action will be taken in the light of the conclusions reached.

The recommendations were only partially implemented, no trial was held, no one punished for breaking the country. Hence Military top continues to indulge in political affairs, two martial laws of about ten years each and thereafter  the army chiefs acting as King Makers through political engineering continue and will continue for how long? nobody knows. This was cited as the main reason for the corruption and ineffectiveness of senior officers.

Bernard Lewis Plan

India has never accepted the existence of Pakistan from its heart and from day one has been trying to undo Pakistan. It illegally annexed Muslim ruled state of Hyderabad, Junah Garah and Kashmir, which was partly liberated by Kashmiris but most of it remains under Indian occupation, waiting for freedom under, United Nations Security Council Resolution instructed the Commission to go to the subcontinent and help the governments of India and Pakistan restore peace and order to the region and prepare for a plebiscite to decide the fate of Kashmir. It remains a far cry, while India is taking all measures to merge Kashmir. The Kashmir L of C remains hot with intermittent exchange of fire and clashes. 

India exploited weaknesses in East Pakistan and managed its separation of Eastern in 1971, but the Indian leadership especially the BJP rule in India has its objective to eliminate the traces of Muslims in Indian and destroy Pakistan. They are taking all illegal, inhuman  measures to achieve this objective. 

On the other hand USA and Israel have their own agenda and plans for Balkanization of the Middle East and Pakistan, to establish Israeli hegemony in the region by making it an international power. Breaking up of Middle East and Pakistan into pieces is one of their objectives for which infamous Bernard Lewis is in place. It is not rigid, renewed and readjusted according to the changing ground situation. [Details were published in DJ] India is very eager to enhance its agenda through playing some role in such plans, Chahbahar, use of Iranian soil for terrorists activities in Pakistan through Commander Kulbhushan Jadhav is the living proof. Indian support to the Baloch terrorists and undermining CPEC is linked to same objective. 

Lessons

The nations who don’t learn lessons from history become history. The Pak Army War History web portal mentions: “Flawed national and operational strategy proved to be disastrous for Pakistan, both politically and militarily power, national and operational strategy, the methodology of crisis and conflict management, and higher direction of war in which Pakistan had been found wanting in 1971.

The conduct of war at lower i.e brigade and below was exemplary, setting many heroic examples of valor even appreciated by the enemy commanders.  The Indian could not capture till the cease-fire; on 16 December, a single town except Jessore, which was not defended for strategic reasons. 

1. No army can win a war against its own people  turn hostile [64 Million Benglis] supported by many times  hostile enemies with a distance of thousand miles between two parts. USSR and  US defeat in Afghanistan are recent examples. East Pakistan required a political not military solution. 
2. The present political situation in Pakistan indicates that no lessons have been learned by the political and military leadership from the past. The military’s continued involvement in running the government after 1958 was one reason for the corruption and ineffectiveness of senior officers in 1971. A large number of senior army officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had lost not only their will to fight but also their professional competence. There have been two military takeovers and rule for about two decades, yet their involvement in political engineering, manipulation and playing as King Maker is considered vital. Eradication of Corruption of the political elite is not their priority, which has ruined this country. The fruit of their continued political involvement with no positive tangible results in the form of a stable political system, justice and accountability will be as devastating as in the past.
3. The direct or indirect military involvement, the glaring example is the  extension of Army Chief’s tenure, which results in demoralisation and loss of able commanders. This is due to weakness of politicians. Military must be fully isolated from civil affairs, which is only possible by putting a stable political system in place in consultation with all the stakeholders.

Why do martial laws fail? 

Ikram Sehgal, the renowned defence and political analyst in his article ”Why martial laws go horribly wrong” quoted his earlier  article of June 29, 1995, ‘Why do martial laws fail?’ He writes:

“Martial laws fail because the initiators of all extra-constitutional rule ride into town on tanks with the lofty aim of saving the country, relying on that platonic national purpose to make themselves credible. They soon adjust the aim to more material (and less patriotic) reasons of self-perpetuation. The original aim remains publicly the same, and becomes an exercise in self-delusion. 

This diversion of aim means that one individual or group is simply replaced by another (or others), instead of being a transition mechanism that provides for and facilitates the process of the democratic system being repaired and renovated to reflect the real genius and aspirations of the people. 

Martial laws fail because the armed forces get themselves involved in mundane, routine bureaucratic duties that they are not supposed to be involved in. 

Martial laws fail because those who impose martial laws do not have correct knowledge about the working of the state or the individuals who run it, and soon surround themselves with sycophants who are usually holdovers from previous governments.” When he imposed his form of martial law in 1999, Musharraf had no intention of heeding this advice rendered in print as far back as 1995. One doubts any future military dictator will; power is a great aphrodisiac.

By the time Musharraf exited, the army’s name was in mud within the country, and outside. Where once the uniform was worn with pride, it became a target of public anger and scorn. (striking resemblance to present, look at Army image building campaign in the media to calm down angry public) Rumor had it that somehow the army’s image had to be reinstated in public eyes. 

Why is Corrupt Political Leadership Installed by the Military?

Instructors in army schools of learning are called ‘Directing Staff’ (DS). Students plan out various alternatives; the ‘plan’ the instructors prefer is called the “DS solution”. To bring the army back from the dumps, the DS solution was to have a predictably corrupt political leader in place against whom all the collective public venom would be directed, and this would deflect public anger away from the army. The calculated risk was that he would not change, but if he did, even that would be counted as a plus. Zardari helped considerably by his recent Nero-like presidential jaunt to London and Paris while the country drowned. This confirmed him as easily the most hated person ever in Pakistan’s history. He couldn’t care less; such revulsion has never really bothered him. 

The army’s success in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, achieved through great sacrifice in blood by all ranks, was a major turnaround for the army’s image. The massive flood relief effort is acting as a force-multiplier bonus to bring the army back to its pedestal in public eyes.

With both positive and negative lessons learnt from the 1999 Pakistan and 2006 Bangladesh military interventions, a refined ‘Pakistan model’ must still remain the route of last resort. 

Uniformed personnel have no business running the government (or for that matter businesses); they must support the honest and capable in governance. Martial laws with platonic intentions end up perpetuating individual rule, as happened in Musharraf’s case, and can go wrong, horribly, horribly wrong.

Readers may draw parallels with  present mess.

1. Milpolitik, Hybrid Politics (denied by the military but ground realities prove otherwise) but as it exists, is more harmful, because it enables the military establishment to evade responsibility. Enjoying Power without responsibility and acting as kingmaker to shuffle, reshuffle the civilian governments like a musical chair game will take us nowhere. This must end, the military should provide stability to the political system and fully concentrate toward the new security challenges before another catastrophe. 
2. George Washington (1732–1799) was an American military officer, statesman, and Founding Father who served as the first president of the United States from 1789 to 1797. Appointed by the Continental Congress as commander of the Continental Army, Washington led the Patriot forces to victory in the American Revolutionary War and served as the president of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, which created the Constitution of the United States and the American federal government. Washington has been called the “Father of the Nation” for his manifold leadership in the formative days of the country. He never thought of martial law but constitution was his gift to the nation. 
3. General Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970) was a French army officer and statesman who led Free France against Nazi Germany in World War II and chaired the Provisional Government of the French Republic from 1944 to 1946 in order to restore democracy in France. In 1958, he came out of retirement when appointed President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) by President René Coty. He rewrote the Constitution of France and founded the Fifth Republic after approval by referendum. He was elected President of France later that year, a position to which he was reelected in 1965 and held until his resignation in 1969. He did not go for martial law.
4. Martial Law is for the defence forces, not for civil rule, which requires a constitution.
5.  The Ideology of Pakistan / Two Nation Theory cannot be relegated or replaced, it must always be the basis of any system in Pakistan.  Strict adherence to the “Ahkam-Al-Quran is the only way for survival and progress for Pakistan to root out moral degradation and corruption. 
6. The Law of Quran on “Rise and fall of Nations” must be kept in view.

“–  If you turn away, He will replace you with another nation; they will not be you”.(Quran 47:38)

Corruption

The corrupt leaders justify corruption by saying that, “corruption is necessary for development and progress, if we stop corruption the economy will come to stand still” This immoral logic is not supported by ground realities. If we look at the world ranking in Corruption Index, the countries with least corruption would not be among the developed and rich top ten countries; Denmark, Finland, Newzealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden,  Switzerland, Neitherland. Luxembourg and Germany. Pakistan is at 140th along with Mayanmar, Mauritania while South Sunad is 180 being the most corrupt country. According to the logic of Pakistani corrupt leaders South Sudan should be amnog most developed countries.

Pakistan is an Islamic State, where the law of Quran and Sunnah stands supreme, and according to Quran corruption, bribery is prohibited. Had there been some benefit Allah would have allowed it, which is not the case. 

“Do not misappropriate one another’s property unjustly, nor bribe the judges, in order to misappropriate a part of other people’s property, sinfully and knowingly. (Quran 2:188).

How can they make Haram (prohibited) as Halaal (permissible)? This is only the prerogative of God, any one doing it is indulging in Shirk (polytheism) or Kufr. ,

“Say, “Did you note how GOD sends down to you all kinds of provisions, then you render some of them unlawful, and some lawful?” Say, “Did GOD give you permission to do this? Or, do you fabricate lies and attribute them to GOD?”(10:59)

Qaid e Azam Muhmaamd Ali Jinnah said: 

Corruption is a curse in India and amongst Muslims, especially the so called educated and intelligencia. Unfortunately, it is this class that is selfish and morally and intellectually corrupt. No doubt this disease is common, but amongst this particular class of Muslims it is rampant. [M.A.Jinnah, to Ispahani, 6 May 1945]

Corruption is not a problem for ruling circles (political and military). The corrupt people have been  installed to power, says deposed PM, it would have been better to drop an atomic bomb on Pakistan. Accountability would have been stronger if eight or ten people had been convicted but the NAB and the judiciary are under their control. 

Chairman NAB (National Accountability Bureau) Justice (Retd) Javed Iqbal has said that corruption is the main reason why we are in trouble. If steps are not taken to eradicate corruption, Kashkool (begging bowl) will remain in hand. There is no doubt that corruption and looting are rampant in the country. Corrupt elements and thieves would have ended corruption by now if they had obeyed the sermons and admonitions but they only understand the language of punishment. That is why the NAB has been set up under the constitution and law of the country, whose main function is to crack down on corrupt elements and bring them to justice and recover the looted money wealth property. It is the responsibility of the Chairman NAB to recover the money looted from the corrupt elements. All the loyalties of NAB are with the state of Pakistan. The state is weakening due to corruption. The money should be returned but also steps should be taken to eradicate corruption. It is the responsibility of NAB to immediately approach the court on the cases of persons who have looted billions of rupees and caused damage to the national exchequer. 

Military  (appear to be) supporting corrupt politicians undermine their position. Patriotic Pakistanis do not want their respected Armed Forces to stand on the wrong side of history Army tops should just stand for the Right (Haqq), people have high expectations and hopes, don’t disappoint them!

“Our mission is only to convey the message clearly”(Quran:36:17)

Getting out of Quagmire

Rationalisation of powers of Legislative, Executive, Judiciary, Military and Media, through reforms is the need of the hour to create a balance. Because in Pakistani environments any pillar with more powers tends to misuse it and undermine the role of other pillars of state. Checks and balances in each are required. Self accountability is not effective, it is mostly used to white wash and coverup blaming others. 

The office of President can be made potent to paly such a role. Presently he should immediately constitute and call a meeting of Guardian Council of Elders (Think Tank, not constitutional amendment required), comprising highly respected  non controversial statesmen, intellectuals , retired, senior politicians,  civil & military officers, Judges, lawyers, journalists,  economists, writers, professors, social scientists, religious scholars  and experts from other fields and segments of society. (around 50 people). It should be such a balanced forum, that no one should be able to point fingers. This Group should  discuss, debate the current situation, find possible solutions,  the unanimous recommendations (with additional points if any one be annexed) be forwarded to the PM, and opposition leader (real).   Chief Justice, COAS and other top people, and be published in the media. [Later efforts can be made to make it a permanent constitutional forum with authority and responsibility for mega crisis management, less than Iranian Guardian Council of clerics]

This will exert pressure on all important institutions and people to wake up and resolve the national crisis in the best national interest alone. 

References:

1. Milpolitik,-1 contours >>>>
2. Milpolitik-2 Article >>>
3. War History Pak Army Official Web Portal:
4. https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/index.php 
5. Pakistan-India Defense Spending – A Comparison
6. دو قومی نظریہ – نظریہ پاکستان Ideology of Pakistan / Two Nation Theory
7. Rise and fall of Nations – Law of Quran قرآن کا قانون عروج و زوال اقوام
8. The Islamic State اسلامی ریاست
9. ووٹ کی شرعی حیثیت
10. Why Electoral Reforms in Pakistan?
11. Judicial Reforms: Why is Pakistan’s justice system perceived to be a ‘weak’ system?
12. Why is it failing to safeguard the lives and property of citizens and protect contracts to boost the economy?
13. Why is timely justice not being delivered to the people? Can our justice system be reformed? >>>> 
14. https://pakistanarmy.gov.pk/War-History.php 
15. Rise and fall of Nations – Law of Quran قرآن کا قانون عروج و زوال اقوام
    1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan_Army_order_of_battle,_December_1971
    • https://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/FormTemplete/frmTempSimple.aspx?MnId=ZF0PAEnqM4gn8sRKsR7iDQ==&ParentID=ygLhinb7JlKcJam5iZhhwQ== 
    • https://pakistanfrontier.com/2021/12/16/pakistan-army-fought-bravely-in-east-pakistan-but-we-had-50-soldiers-against-their-1-soldier-says-former-indian-army-chief-sam-manekshaw/
    • When Russia Stunned US & UK Naval Forces And Helped India Win The 1971 War 
    • Opinion: Russia’s defining moment in the Ind-Pak War 1971
    • https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1971
    • .Manak Shaw 18 minutes: https://youtu.be/IzlM7gM9Cks.
    • The National Service : 31 FF
    • https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahabzada_Yaqub_Khan#East_Pakistan:_
    • military_advisor_and_governorship_(1969%E2%80%9371) [9]4
    • “Quran Commands”/ Ahkam-Al-Quran/ احکام القرآن / https://bit.ly/AhkamAlQuraan
    • Operation Searchlight – Wikipedia
    • Hamoodur Rahman Commission – Wikipedia
    • Yahya Khan | president of Pakistan – Encyclopedia Britannica
    • https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Armed_Forces#General_staff 
    • Why Electoral Reforms in Pakistan?
    • https://institute.global/policy/what-velayat-e-faqih / 
    • https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guardianship_of_the_Islamic_Jurist
    • https://www.eurasiareview.com/25072014-pakistan-military-element-national-power-analysis/
    • https://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/india-2/national-power-elements-evaluation-and-limitations/48489

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Kargil- 1999

https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/War-History.php 

The Kargil War, also known as the Kargil conflict, was an armed conflict fought between India and Pakistan from May to July 1999 in the Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere along the Line of Control (LoC).

 

Pak Army Official Version

Kargil valley comprises a cluster of most rugged, inhospitable and difficult to conquer mountain peaks and ridges. A part of the valley has been liberated by Freedom Fighters during Kashmir War 1947-49, however later, it was recaptured by the regular Indian Army in 1971illegally, as In line with Karachi agreement of 1949, Cease-fire line was delineated up to Pt NJ9842. Kashmiris and native of GB continued to manifest their resolve for freedom of lost territory. In early 1999, locals and Kashmiris freedom fighters sneaked across LOC and occupied the vacant height dominating Kargil, Dras and Batalik areas. By April 1999, Indians realized the strategic surprise achieved by Mujahideen and responded with full military might. India made hue and cry at international level and named it as “infiltration” by Pakistan Army. Consequently Pak Army had to come into rescue of Mujahideen and bravely fought against Indian. This limited war ended in mid July and both armies reverted to pre-war positions. As per Indians, they lost 553 officers and soldiers (actual figure is much more) two helicopters and a combat aircraft whose Pilot named Nachi Kainta was arrested by Pakistan Army. Many Pakistani Soldiers laid their lives while defending their motherland. Captain Kernal Sher and Havildar Lalak Jan were among the recipients of Nishan – e- Haider.

The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani troops—disguised as Kashmiri militants—into positions on the Indian side of the LoC, which serves as the de facto border between the two states in Kashmir. The Indian Army, later supported by the Indian Air Force, recaptured some  of the positions on the Indian side of the LoC. Facing international diplomatic opposition, Pakistani forces withdrew from the remaining Indian positions along the LoC.

The men who witnessed the Kargil fiasco continue to spill the beans. Lt Gen (retd) Shahid Aziz, a former chief of general staff of Pakistan Army said what he witnessed in the summer of ’99, says the ‘misadventure’ was a four-man show the details of which were hidden from the rest of the military commanders initially.

This is the first time someone this senior in the military hierarchy of the time has spoken in such detail and with such frankness about the fiasco that was Kargil.

According to him, initially the Kargil operation was known only to Gen Pervez Musharraf, chief of general staff Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz, FCNA (Force Command Northern Areas) commander Lt Gen Javed Hassan and 10-Corps commander Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmad.

The majority of corps commanders and principal staff officers were kept in the dark, says Gen Aziz. “Even the-then director general military operations (DGMO) Lt Gen Tauqir Zia came to know about it later,” says Gen Aziz who at the time was serving as director general of the analysis wing of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

He said that Gen Musharraf worked on a policy of “need to know” throughout his tenure as COAS and later president — in other words, Musharraf would issue orders to only those who were required to implement orders instead of first consulting corps commanders and other military officers.

The Kargil operation began in the summer of 1999 when Pakistani soldiers infiltrated into positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control. The infiltration, which managed to cut off Indian supply lines, took New Delhi by surprise.

Initially, Islamabad claimed that the infiltrators were mujahideen but it could not maintain this façade for long. The Indian response coupled with international pressure forced the Pakistan military to withdraw.

However, the aftermath of the operation served to heighten tensions between Gen Musharraf and then prime minister Nawaz Sharif which culminated in the October coup when the military removed the elected government and took over.

‘Operation was never planned’

“The Pakistan Army did not plan the operation because Gen Musharraf never saw Kargil as a major operation. Only the FCNA was involved in it and perhaps a section of 10-Corps,” says Aziz, adding that it was a major intelligence failure for India. More details of the operation are expected in Gen Aziz’s book which is hitting the bookshelves next week.

“It was a miscalculated move,” he says when asked about the operation, adding that “its objectives were not clear and its ramifications were not properly evaluated”.

Gen Aziz was not averse to speaking frankly about the operation.

“It was a failure because we had to hide its objectives and results from our own people and the nation. It had no purpose, no planning and nobody knows even today how many soldiers lost their lives.”

He said he was personally not aware of what information had been shared with then prime minister Nawaz Sharif, but he felt that Mr Sharif “was not fully in the picture”.

He, however, recalls a general telling him that Nawaz Sharif asked “when are you giving us Kashmir?” during an informal discussion. This suggests, says Gen Aziz, that Mr Sharif was not completely in the dark.

 

Gen Aziz himself first discovered that something was up when he came across wireless communication intercepts from which he could tell that something was making the Indian forces panic.

“The intercepts worried me as I thought we were not aware of whatever was unsettling the Indians. I deputed two officers to figure out what was happening.” The next day’s wireless intercepts were clear enough for Gen Aziz to realise that the Indians’ anxiety stemmed from the fact that someone from Pakistan had captured some areas in Kargil-Drass sector but it was not clear if they were mujahideen or regular troops. “I took these intercepts to then ISI director general Lt Gen Ziauddin Butt and asked what was happening.”

It was then that Gen Aziz was finally told by Gen Butt that the army had captured some area in Kargil.

This, says Gen Aziz, was not right. In his opinion, he should have been told about the proposed operation in advance so that he could have provided his analysis in advance.

A day after this conversation between Aziz and Butt, the latter called Gen Aziz and told him that he had been invited to the General Headquarters for a briefing on Kargil.

The briefing

During the briefing, which was also attended by all the principal staff officers, Director General Military Operations Lt Gen Tauqir Zia explained that units of NLI (Northern Light Infantry) and regular troops had captured areas in the Drass-Kargil sector.

Aziz feels that even though the briefing was conducted by DGMO Tauqir Zia, it was clear that he had not been aware of the operation from the beginning.

The day after the DGMO briefing, the friction at Kargil operation was reported in the Pakistani media; interestingly, the Indian media had carried stories a day earlier.

This shows that the military leadership was informed about such a critical operation only after it began and by that time information was trickling down to the media.

At the briefing, Gen Zia did explain the ‘objectives’ of the operation — it had cut off India’s supply lines to Siachen because of the closure of Zojila Pass on Srinagar-Drass-Kargil-Leh road.

This, said Gen Zia, would block India from supplying its troops in Siachen and subsequently, India would evacuate Siachen. That this did not happen is now history.

Gen Aziz says this was because the planners “miscalculated the Indian response and overall repercussions”.

At the briefing, Gen Tauqir Zia talked about airing pre-recorded Pashto messages that he hoped would be intercepted by the Indian forces. His objective was that these intercepts would fool India into thinking that the Afghan mujahideen had occupied areas in Kargil.

Gen Aziz says he objected to this plan as “these would get exposed very shortly”. He adds that this led to lengthy discussions and finally Tauqir Zia conceded that the truth could not be hidden for long.

In retrospect, Gen Aziz feels that “even if only NLI men were up there, it would be wrong to suggest that the operation was carried out by paramilitary forces because NLI falls under the military chain of command unlike the Rangers that are headed by a military officer but technically they fall under the control of the ministry of interior”.

The study that never was

But for Gen Aziz the end of the operation did not mean the end of the matter. After he was promoted as chief of general staff, he says that in 2004 he ordered a small study to inquire into what miscalculations had led to such a huge loss of men and money. He also asked each battalion concerned for details.

But the reaction was swift.

An angry Gen Musharraf called him and asked what the objectives of the study were. “I told him it would provide a professional understanding of our mistakes and losses but Gen Musharraf insisted that this was not the time for such a study and ordered that it be stopped.

References/ Links

1. Pak Army Portal on Kargil: https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/kargil.php
2. Kargil adventure was four-man show: General:  by Khaleeq Kiani Published Dawn January 28, 2013 :  https://www.dawn.com/news/782010/kargiladventure-was-four-man-show-general
3.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kargil_War 

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Pulwama  2019

The Pulwama was a false flag operation by Indian intelligence to influence Indian elections conducted in 2019 escalated tensions between India and Pakistan to the brink of war. The crisis was sparked after a deadly militant attack on an Indian paramilitary facility in Pulwama, located in occupied Kashmir. This incident started to spiral into a bigger situation, as India launched ill-advised air strikes inside Pakistan, hitting what it wrongly said was a ‘militant camp’ in Balakot. Soon enough, Pakistani and Indian jets faced off against each other and Pakistan downed an Indian aircraft, capturing Indian airman Abhinandan and later returning him to his country after offering him ‘fantastic’ tea. It was called Operation Swift Retort by PAF.

Pakistan responded with its own airstrike the next day, targeting military installations in Indian-administered Kashmir. The situation rapidly escalated, and both countries engaged in skirmishes along the LOC, leading to casualties on both sides.

THE Pulwama-Balakot crisis of February 2019 brought Pakistan and India close to war, and as an explosive interview given by a former governor of held Kashmir has revealed, the stand-off was cunningly milked by the BJP government in New Delhi.

The international community played a crucial role in de-escalating the crisis, urging restraint and calling for dialogue between India and Pakistan. Diplomatic efforts, including the intervention of other nations, helped prevent further escalation and brought the two countries back from the brink of war.

Despite the de-escalation, the situation in the region remains tense and complex, with longstanding disputes over Kashmir remaining a significant point of contention between India and Pakistan. 

1. References/ Links
2. https://www.dawn.com/news/1748101
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Pulwama_attack
4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Jammu_and_Kashmir_airstrikes.

 

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Pakistan Defence Budget

“Muster against them all the military strength and cavalry that you can afford so that you may strike terror into the hearts of the enemy of Allah and of your, and others besides them who are unknown to you but known to Allah. Remember that whatever you will spend in the cause of Allah, shall be paid back to you in full and you shall not be treated unjustly.” [Quran:8:60]

Why have Defence Forces, or Why spend money on Defence? Same can be spend for health, education and developments. This is a popular  FAQ. The Defence Forces are for the defence of Country against Threat. If there is no major threat, then the expenditure on Defence can be reduced to minimum. Pakistan has hostile neighbor India on east, fought many wars and battles since 1947, even loosing East Pakistan. India will not spare any chance to undo remaining Pakistan if there is weakness. Kashmir is burning issue unsettled. The humanitarian crisis and water crisis for Pakistan as India controls the rivers.

Defence Budget 2022-23

Pakistan on Friday announced that it will allocate Rs 1,523 billion for defence, an increase of over 11 per cent than last year, as Finance Minister presented a Rs 9,502 billion annual budget in Parliament for the fiscal year 2022-23.

This year’s defence allocation of Rs 1,523 is 11.16 per cent higher than last year’s allocation of Rs 1,370 billion.

More : https://tribune.com.pk/story/2360953/rs152tr-allocated-for-defence-spending

Pakistan’s 2020-21 budget

Expenditure is $41  [out of total  $44 billion]

Debt Servicing: $19.35 billion/  47%   [Ext debt of $114 billion]

 Defense:  $8.5 billion / 19%

In 2016, the world spent U.S. $1686 billion that was around 2.3 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP). India plans to spend $ 55.7 billion in 2017 which is 2.25 percent of its GDP; in comparison Pakistan’s defense budget is $9 billion which is 3.4 percent of its total economy. Thus, Pakistan trails far behind India in defense spending; its financial provision is almost 7 times short of India’s defense resources. It has to defend its autonomy and meaningfulness in the South Asian state system within these limited resources. This is an attempt to understand the need and importance of defense spending for a nation-state, examine a comparative analysis of India and Pakistan’s patterns of defense spending and its impact on Pakistan.

According to Global Index of Defense Budgets, India has surpassed Germany at eighth position in highest military expenditure. It spends more on national defense compared to Brazil, South Korea, Italy and Canada. Pakistan on the other hand is on the 27 number of the same index; accordingly, it is expected that by 2020 India will rank third in world defense expenditure of 70 billion dollars after USA and China.

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The debate on the defense spending generally focuses on the notion of guns versus butter model that demonstrates a relationship between a nation’s investment in defense and civilian goods. It is argued that the basic responsibility of a state is to protect itself and its citizens from outside aggression. Any failure on this count will stun the growth of all the sectors of a state and its society. It might lead to disorder in the society and result in the ultimate collapse or possible annihilation of the state. Keeping this perspective in view, a number of studies both qualitative and quantitative have been done to demonstrate the linkage between the defense spending and the increase in economic growth of a nation-state. The best example is the European Union that started with the Marshall Plan,taking roots after the establishment of the security structure in the form of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The opponents of this perspective argue that defense spending is a process of diversion of resources from productive economic sector to unproductive defense sector. They perceive the defense spending as a burden on the national economy that distorts the growth of all sectors of a nation-state. The studies done in this perspective have focused on the linkage between defense spending and the increase in the ratio of poverty in a country especially in the Least Developed Countries (LDC). Interestingly, most of the developed states spend huge proportion of their resources on the modernization of equipment and training of their forces. These developed states benefit immensely from the returns of their dominant strategic relationship with other states, trading in defense-related equipment and technology and using their defense-related knowledge and technical know-how in the civilian areas. Essentially, it is difficult for any state to differentiate between two fundamental objectives of its existence that is to ensure the national security and welfare of its citizens. No subordinate state can provide its citizens protection and prosperity against direct or indirect intervention or aggression of the other dominant state.

Thus, gun and butter are inseparable interests of a meaningfully autonomous nation-state; they pursue at the same time the twin objectives of security and prosperity. For an autonomous state, allocation of an adequate amount of funds for defense is a compulsory and competitive phenomenon that is conducted through the interpretation of the balance of threat and geo-strategic location in which it is placed. It is a perpetual, rational and integrated phenomenon of adjustment-readjustment of resource spending priorities to maintain mutually beneficial balance. That is why; defense spending is an ever-changing and complex behavior of a nation-state. It continuously swings focus between security and economic priorities.

In the South Asian state system, two factors determine defense spending of a state. Firstly, the relatively dominant position of India as compared to the rest of the regional states in terms of almost all the elements of power – geography, population and economy. This position of India gives it an illusion of grandeur and power and encourages it to struggle for the establishment of a hegemonic relationship with the smaller states of the region. Secondly, Pakistan with its middle power stature desires to remain autonomous and seek solution of the Kashmir issue through revision of the South Asian state systems borders. A unique asymmetrical strategic position exists in the region in which Pakistan cannot allow India to treat it like other small states of the region because this will turn it into an insignificant colony of Indian cheap goods. This meaningless position has never been acceptable to its people. Therefore, Pakistan is pushed to resist Indian attempts to establish its hegemony and defend its autonomy to remain meaningful to itself, regional and international powers’ structure.

India considered it essential to modernize its armed forces through establishment of defense industry and transfer of technology. Its 362 million people – almost 29.5 percent of its population – live in abject poverty. Ignoring them totally, it has spent huge amount of its finances to accumulate weapons systems and develop defense-related industry.

On the other hand, India faces no serious threat, both regional and international, to its security and way of life. Its struggle is for a status and role at the international level by its domination of the South Asian region. It wishes to attain power to extend or deny security and prosperity to the regional states. The hegemonic policy is projected as a defense against the threat mainly from China and secondly from Pakistan though relatively not very significant. India considered it essential to modernize its armed forces through establishment of defense industry and transfer of technology. Its 362 million people – almost 29.5 percent of its population – live in abject poverty. Ignoring them totally, it has spent huge amount of its finances to accumulate weapons’ systems and develop defense-related industry.

In 2003 and 2004, the Indian defense budget was around 14 billion dollars, 2.3 percent of its GDP; since then it has increased by 7 to 9 percent every year and has reached 55.7 billion. Russia has been the main beneficiary of this defense spending. It has filled almost 70 percent of weapons and technology needs of India to make its aggressive doctrine – Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) – a reality. In return, Russia has received huge amounts of payment; for instance, it received 9.355 billion dollars in the period 2001-05. India accounted for 14 percent of global arms imports from 2011-2015, a 90 percent increase over the previous five years. Due to this Indian arms manufacturers are among the top 100 companies worldwide, with billions of earnings. Now United States has also jumped into the business; in 2014-15, it sold over 1.4 billion dollars worth of weapons to India.

The obsessive power accumulation on the part of India to achieve regional hegemony has very serious consequences for the autonomous existence of Pakistan. It has faced three wars with India; in one conflict in 1971, its eastern part was separated from Pakistan and established as a separate state, Bangladesh. The Indian intervention through the instrument of Mukti Bahini converted a normal protest movement, after a decade long autocratic rule, for political rights into a violent secessionist movement; later India invaded East Pakistan to complete its hegemonic designs. It was part of Indian covert warfare against Pakistan that resurfaced in 1980s in Sindh, and now in Karachi and Balochistan. It also supports sectarian terrorism to weaken Pakistan. Thus Pakistan has been forced to invest relatively more of its national resources into defense.

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India accounted for 14 percent of global arms imports from 2011-2015, a 90 percent increase over the previous five years. Due to this Indian arms manufacturers are among the top 100 companies worldwide, with billions of earnings. Now United States has also jumped into the business; in 2014-15, it sold over 1.4 billion dollars’ worth of weapons to India.

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The Pakistani leadership realized that it had to match its capabilities against the sophisticated weaponry of its adversary; that is why it demonstrated no hesitation in investing in the defense of the country. But two factors weighed in the minds of the decision-makers: firstly, that they cannot match many times bigger economy of India; and secondly, no plan should undermine the economic health of Pakistan. Therefore, at times of high defense spending like the conflict with India and the Afghan crisis, the rate of growth was high, like in the late 50s and 60s, it was more than 8 percent. Additionally, the defense spending, despite extreme situations, remained far less than the 45 percent for loan repayment. The decade of 90s was the most difficult period for Pakistan. Due to unstable domestic political situation, foreign aid had been discontinued and sanctions were imposed on Pakistan because it had conducted nuclear tests. The defense spending till 1999 was around an average of 6.4 percent of the GDP but after that it started to decline further to provide more space to other sectors of the economy. In 2000, it was 5.1 percent of the GDP; it was to the tune of $2,842 million back to the level of 1990. It was a decrease of 22.48 percent. The year 2000 was a period of major transformation of the economy. Pakistan privatized state-subsidized utilities companies such as banks and Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation. Additionally, reforms were also introduced in trade and tariff, higher education, money laundering, intellectual property piracy, and agricultural and industrial sectors.

In order to support the economy the defense spending was further brought down to 4.1 percent; in 2007-8, the defense spending was frozen. By the end of the decade, Pakistan’s economy started to show signs of improvement. The defense spending was around 3.1 percent of the GDP; in terms of dollars, it was $ 7,641 million. But these figures are in sharp contrast to Indian GDP of two trillion dollars with the defense spending of 55.7 billion dollars, a fact that can never be lost to Pakistani decision-makers and people.

In conclusion, it is argued that the growing sharp imbalance between India and Pakistan could have very serious consequences both for Pakistan’s meaningful autonomous survival and strategic harmony and prosperity of the South Asian region. Pakistan cannot ignore its security and welfare of its people. It will face extreme difficulties if its economy does not grow and increase the amount that is needed to defend itself.

Pakistan has always tried to reduce the burden of defense expenditure on the economy while improving the quality of its men and material for a credible security apparatus. In this regard, Pakistan has followed two policies. One, it has attempted to build alliances with the developed states to have access to sophisticated technology and capital. The pursuit of such a policy brought it closer to the United States and China. Two, Pakistan has developed indigenous defense industry to reduce its dependence on foreign sources and to contribute its share in the domestic economy. Pakistan joined the U.S.-sponsored defense pacts in the 50s. In return, it received help to develop both its armed forces and its domestic economy. The growth of import substitute industries in the 60s was the result of this policy. In 1965, Pakistan was able to effectively defend itself against the aggression of many times more powerful India. Similarly, the U.S. assistance during the Afghan Jihad and war against terror improved the capabilities of Pakistan and helped it to sustain the economic losses.

At the same time, the alliance with the U.S. created a dependency on the U.S. and entangled Pakistan first in the international conflicts of the Cold War and later in the war against terror. At the domestic level, it created social divisions that hindered the process of integration of various sections of the society in the post-independence nation-building process. At the time of independence, Pakistan had practically no defense industry that could fulfill its basic defense needs. India refused to give it its due share in defense equipment; after a lot of reluctance it merely gave six crore rupees as compensation. In 1951, Pakistan Ordnance Factory (POF) was established to initiate the process of indigenous production of equipment. In 1971, the Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) was set up to fulfill the requirements of the Army to rebuild, upgrade, and manufacture tanks, tank guns and armored personnel carriers. In order to fulfill the requirements of the Air Force, the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex was built at Kamra in 1972, the Heavy Forge Foundry in 1978, and the Heavy Rebuild Factory in 1979. Pakistan’s defense industry provided equipment worth 6.3 billion dollars in 2009 and 10.4 billion dollars in 2015 to armed forces to fulfill its requirements through domestic infrastructure. In 2016, the local defense industry saved foreign exchange worth 1.5 billion dollars. During four years, 2012 to 2015, the defense industry also exported its products worth over 100 million dollars to more than forty countries; and in just one year, 2016, the exports reached 63 million dollars. Though it is a commendable achievement but still it is far behind the Indian exports of 330 million dollars in 2016 and its defense minister Manohar Parrikar has set the export target of 2 billion dollars by 2019 as part of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” scheme.

The comparison of India-Pakistan defense spending is a reflection of relative power differentiation between the two countries. The Indian economy is 8 times the size of Pakistani economy and is growing by over 7 percent as compared to 4 percent of Pakistan. In economic terms India virtually adds one whole of Pakistan’s total economic turnover to its economy every year. According to Global Index of Defense Budgets, India has surpassed Germany at eighth position in highest military expenditure. It spends more on national defense compared to Brazil, South Korea, Italy and Canada. Pakistan on the other hand is on the 27th number of the same index; accordingly, it is expected that by 2020 India will rank third in world defense expenditure of 70 billion dollars after USA and China. This rising Indian power is continually increasing Pakistan’s historic sense of vulnerability. Pakistan’s situation becomes more complicated when it is facing a domestic challenge of terrorism that is getting covert support from India through unsettled Afghanistan. Its present allocation that is around 18 percent of its budgetary expenditure is not quite adequate. It badly needs to expand its economy to broaden the national cake so that within the present percentage the required volume of resources are multiplied. Additionally, it is also required to increase its technological level to balance the Indian edge.

In this regard, it may not have the support of USA that is developing closer strategic relations with India against China. China has a 53 billion dollars trade surplus with India. Furthermore, India is the largest importer of arms in the world, from 2011 to 2015 its arms import accounted for 14 percent of the global arms imports. Almost every country wants to have a share of this trade. This purchasing power has provided India a new sense of power and influence in the region and beyond. It likes to dictate terms of state-to-state interaction in the South Asian State system whose limited effect Pakistan has faced in the shape of eight F-16 sale deal with USA or in case of JF-17 sale deal to Sri Lanka. In future with increased strategic and economic imbalance it can attempt to block Pakistani access to high-end technologies.

Pakistan for long thought that conventional strategic imbalance can reasonably be corrected with the development of a nuclear deterrence. It has developed a relatively effective nuclear deterrence against India. Nuclear weapons are political instrument and cannot be used rationally in war situation because after a nuclear war there will be no difference between the victor and the vanquished. Thus, nuclear deterrence is used as a psychological phenomenon to achieve strategic-political objective. It is a delicate deterrence which requires constant upkeeping in order to yield positive results; if any action undermines the nature of deterrence, its effectiveness is undermined. The new weapon system that Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) is developing can have negative impact on the nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. It is developing K-4 (SLBM). K-4 is a nuclear capable intermediate-range 3500 km submarine-launched ballistic missile that will nuclearize the Indian-ocean with Indian Arihant-class submarines and give India second strike capability. Secondly, India is developing indigenous ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. It has tested Ashwin missile that is an advanced air defense (AAD) anti-ballistic missile designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles in the endo-atmosphere at an altitude of 30 km. Though, anti-nuclear defense systems are very expensive to develop and to give an illusion of defense against a nuclear attack, there is no deference whether a nuclear weapon explodes at ground or in air. These developments have a theoretical possibility to undermine the deterrence value of the nuclear deterrence. These proactive and aggressive Indian strategic plans can in future lower the nuclear threshold level and force Pakistan to enter into regional arms’ race.

In conclusion, it is argued that the growing sharp imbalance between India and Pakistan could have very serious consequences both for Pakistan’s meaningful autonomous survival and strategic harmony and prosperity of the South Asian region. Pakistan cannot ignore its security and welfare of its people. It will face extreme difficulties if its economy does not grow and increase the amount that is needed to defend itself. India as the larger state in the region has the key to restore strategic harmony and utilize the potential of the region in new economic world to end poverty and bring prosperity to the people. It will never be able to subjugate the region because of its people and competing foreign powers; even the USA will not allow it to pursue regional hegemony thoughtlessly which will push India to a disastrous arms race and outside great powers intervention. For a peaceful South Asia, it needs to resolve its long-standing conflicting issues and stop its interference in the domestic affairs of the regional states.

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• The writer is on the faculty of Quaid-i-Azam University (School of Politics and International Relations) E-mail: mujeebir@yahoo.com
• Source: .https://www.hilal.gov.pk/eng-article/detail/NTY0.html.

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• پاکستا ن آرمی ۔۔۔ ملک کا  دفاعی بجٹ کیا ہے حقیقت ۔ کیا ہے افسانہ 
• پاکستان کے دفاعی بجٹ میں عملی طور پر کوی اضافہ نہی کیا گیا
  ۔ خطرے کے اِدراک، درپیش چینلجز اور پاکستان آرمی کی ڈپلائمنٹ کو مدِ نظر رکھتے ہوئے ہمیں دفاعی بجٹ کا تنقیدی اور تقابلی جائزہ لینا ہوگا۔
  ۔ دشمن کا بڑھتا ہوا دفاعی بجٹ افواجِ پاکستان کیلئے ہمشیہ سے چیلنج رہا ہے۔لیکن اس کے باوجودہمشیہ افواجِ پاکستان کو تنقید کا نشانہ بنایا جاتا ہے۔
  پچھلے دو سالوں میں آرمی نے اپنے بجٹ میں کوئی اضافہ نہیں لیا ہے۔
  ۔ اتنے بڑے خطرات کو موجودگی میں GDPکا صرف2فیصد دفاعی بجٹ ہے۔
  ۔ ہندوستان کا دفاعی بجٹ 70بلین ڈالر جبکہ پاکستان کا دفاعی بجٹ11بلین ڈالر ہے۔
  ۔ بھارت پاکستان کی نسبت اپنے ایک فوجی پر سالانہ 4گنا زیادہ خرچ کر تا ہے۔
  ۔ پاکستان اپنے ایک فوجی پر سالانہ13400ڈالر، انڈیا 42000ڈالر،امریکہ 392,000ڈالر، ایران 23000ڈالرجبکہ سعودی عرب371,000ڈالر خرچ کرتا ہے۔
  ۔ سالانہ دِفاعی اخراجات کے حوالے سے بھارت دُنیا کا تیسرا بڑا ملک ہے۔
  ۔ بھارت کا دِفاعی بجٹ پاکستان کی نسبت 7گُنا زیادہ ہے۔
  ۔ بھارت2016ء سے2020ء کے دوران دُنیا کا دوسرا بڑا اسلحہ درآمد کرنے والا ملک رہا۔
  ۔ بھارت صرف جدید اسلحہ کی خریداری کے لیے سالانہ لگ بھگ18سے19بلین ڈالر لگاتا ہے جو کہ پاکستان بجٹ کا تقریباََ 2گُنا ہے۔
• دیکھتے ہیں کہ دیگر ممالک کا ڈیفنس بجٹ کتنا ہے؟
  ۔ سعودی عرب کا ڈیفنس بجٹ 55.6بلین ڈالر، چائنہ کا ڈیفنس بجٹ293بلین ڈالر، ایران کا ڈیفنس بجٹ24.6بلین ڈالر،UAE کا ڈیفنس بجٹ22.5بلین ڈالراورترکی کا ڈیفنس بجٹ 20.7بلین ڈالر ہے۔
• پاکستان کا دفاعی بجٹ کیا ہے؟
  2021 / 22کا دِفاعی بجٹ قومی بجٹ کا 16فیصدہے
  ۔ اسی میں سے 7فیصد پاکستان آرمی جبکہ باقی نیوی اور ائیر فورس کے حصے میں آتا ہے۔
  ۔ پچھلے کئی سالوں سے انفلیشن کی وجہ سے عملاََ پاکستان کا دفاعی بجٹ کم ہوا ہے۔
  ۔ اگر ہم افراط زَر کی شرح (inflation index)کا موازنہ کریں تو رواں معاشی سال میں افراطِ زر کی شرح 11.3 فیصد ہے
  ۔ کیا اسی 2 فیصد GDPکے اندر پاکستان کی مسلح افواج نے پاکستان کے دفاع کو ناقابلِ تسخیر نہیں بنایا؟
  ۔ کیا اسی کے دوران پاکستان نے کووڈکے خلاف فرائض سرانجام نہیں دیے؟
  ۔ کیا اسی بجٹ سے ہم نے مغربی بارڈر کے دفاع کو فینسنگ اور بارڈر فورٹس تعمیر کرکے مضبوط نہیں بنایا؟
  ۔ 2019 / 20میں ملکی معاشی صورتحال کے پیشِ نظر دِفاعی بجٹ منجمد رہا۔
  ۔ 2020 / 21میں بھی پاک افواج کی تنخواہوں میں کوئی اضافہ نہیں ہو ا۔
  ۔رواں مالی سال میں روپے کی قدر میں ۲۵ فیصد کمی واقع ہوئی جس کے باوجود دِفاعی ضروریات کو دستیاب وسائل کے اندر رہتے ہوئے پورا کیا گیا۔
  ۔ 2018ء کے بعدکولیشن سپورٹ فنڈ کی بندش کے باوجود دِفاعی اور سیکورٹی کی ضروریات کو ملکی وسائل سے ہی پورا کیا گیا۔ آپریشن ردّالفساد کے اہداف اور دائرہ کار اور دیگر سیکورٹی اُمور میں کوئی کمی نہیں آنے دی گئی۔
• ٹیکس کی ادائیگی
  ۔ پاک افواج اور پاک افواج کے رِفاعی اداروں نے ٹیکس اور ڈیوٹیز کی مَدمیں 935 بلین روپے سے زائد رقم قومی خزانے میں جمع کرائ
• ————-
• ڈیفنس بجٹ-2
• ایک پرانا آرٹیکل ہے مگر فیصد تناسب میں کوئی خاص تبدیلی نہیں ہوتی ہر سال انفلیشن کے مطابق دس سے بارہ فیصد بجٹ میں اضافہ اصل بجٹ کو فیکس رکھتا ہے-
• پاکستان کے دفاعی بجٹ کے بارے میں غلط فہمی ہے کہ یہ مکمل بجٹ کا 70 یا 80 فیصد حصہ لے جاتا ہے ایسا قطعاً نہیں۔ پچھلے مالی سال 2014-15 کا بجٹ اٹھا کر دیکھ لیجئے۔ مکمل بجٹ کا خرچ 4302 ارب روپے تھا جو مالی سال2013-14 سے7.9 فیصد زیادہ تھا۔ اس میں سے700 ارب روپے ڈیفنس افیئرز اینڈ سروسز کے لئے رکھے گئے تھے۔ جسے دفاعی بجٹ کہا جاتا ہے جو کہ کل کے بجٹ کا16.27 فیصد تھا-
  الڈوس ہگزلے ایک مشہور انگریزی ادیب ہے‘ وہ کہتا ہے:’’کچھ چیزیں ایسی ہیں جنہیں ہم جانتے ہیں اور کچھ چیزیں ایسی ہیں جنہیں ہم نہیں جانتے اور انہی کے درمیان ہمارے ادراک اور شعور کے بند دروازے پائے جاتے ہیں۔‘‘
  کسی بھی بات کو سمجھنے کے لئے اسے جاننا بہت ضروری ہے۔ جانیں گے نہیں تو سمجھیں گے نہیں۔ اور جب ہم جان لیتے ہیں تو ہمارے ادراک اور شعور کے بند دروازے کھل جاتے ہیں۔ یہی بنیادی اصول ایک صحافی کے لئے بھی بہت ضروری ہے۔ جاننا۔۔۔ ! تحقیق کرنا۔۔۔! اپنے شعور کے بند دروازے کھولنا اور دوسروں تک اس ادراک کو پہچاننا۔ آج جس اہم معاملے پر میں نے قلم اٹھایا ہے وہ ہے ’’پاکستان کا دفاعی بجٹ‘‘ یہ معاملہ جتنا اہم ہے اتنا ہی حساس ہے ۔ اور جتنا حساس ہے اتنا ہی غلط فہمی پر بھی مبنی ہے!
  جب ہم کسی چیز کو جانتے نہیں تو اس کے بارے میں غلط اطلاع یا غلط تاثر پھیلا دیتے ہیں اور ایسا ہی کچھ معاملہ پاکستان کے دفاعی بجٹ کے متعلق بھی ہے۔ اغیار کی ریشہ دوانیاں اور پراپیگنڈہ تو ایک طرف اس پر آخر میں بات کروں گی‘ پہلے ان ’’اپنوں‘‘ کے لئے کچھ حقائق سامنے رکھوں گی جو غلط فہمی یا تحقیق کی کمی کے باعث پاکستان کے دفاعی بجٹ پر انگلیاں اٹھاتے ہیں۔
  یہ بھی واضح رہے کہ خطے میں پاکستان کا دفاعی بجٹ سب سے کم ہے۔ دنیا کے تمام ممالک کے دفاعی بجٹ پر بنی ہوئی ورلڈ بینک کی رپورٹ اٹھا کر دیکھ لیجئے۔ اندازہ ہو جائے گا کہ خطے میں پاکستان کا دفاعی بجٹ کیا ہے؟
  پاکستان کے دفاعی بجٹ کے بارے میں غلط فہمی ہے کہ یہ مکمل بجٹ کا 70 یا 80 فیصد حصہ لے جاتا ہے ایسا قطعاً نہیں۔ پچھلے مالی سال 2014-15 کا بجٹ اٹھا کر دیکھ لیجئے۔ مکمل بجٹ کا خرچ 4302 ارب روپے تھا جو مالی سال2013-14 سے7.9 فیصد زیادہ تھا۔ اس میں سے 700 ارب روپے ڈیفنس افیئرز اینڈ سروسز کے لئے رکھے گئے تھے۔ جسے دفاعی بجٹ کہا جاتا ہے جو کہ کل کے بجٹ کا16.27 فیصد تھا- یہ بجٹ افواجِ پاکستان کی تینوں شاخوں‘ آرمی‘ ایئر فورس اور نیوی کے لئے تھا۔ اس بجٹ میں سے 48 فیصد آرمی‘ 20 ایئر فورس اور 10 فیصد نیوی کے لئے مختص تھا۔ جبکہ باقی ماندہ بجٹ انٹر سروسز اداروں‘ ڈیفنس پروڈکشن ڈویژن اور پاکستان ملٹری اکاؤنٹس ڈیپارٹمنٹ کے لئے مختص تھے۔ اس بجٹ کا زیادہ حصہ ملازمین کی تنخواہوں اور دیگر سہولیات پر خرچ کرنے کے لئے مختص تھا۔ دفاعی بجٹ کا خرچ تنخواہوں‘صحت‘ ٹریننگ‘ آپریشنز کی فنڈنگ‘ ہتھیاروں اور دیگر سہولیات‘ دیکھ بھال اور نئی اشیاء کی خریداری پر مشتمل ہوتا ہے۔ یہاں یہ بات بھی قابلِ ذکر ہے کہ2014- 15 کے لئے ملکی اور علاقائی صورت حال کے پیشِ نظر دفاعی بجٹ میں 173 ارب روپے اضافے کی خواہش ظاہر کی گئی تھی لیکن اس کے برعکس اضافہ صرف73 ارب روپے کیا گیا تھا۔
  پچھلی دو دہائیوں سے پاکستان کے دفاعی بجٹ میں مسلسل کٹوتی کی جارہی ہے۔ باوجود اس حقیقت کے کہ ایک دہائی سے زیادہ عرصے سے پاکستان اگلے محاذوں پر دہشت گردی کے خلاف جنگ لڑ رہا ہے اور پچھلے سال سے آپریشن ضربِ عضب بھی جاری ہے‘ جس کے آپریشنل اخراجات کا اندازہ اس کی کامیابیوں کے تناسب سے لگایا جاسکتا ہے۔یہاں واضح کرنا بھی ضرور ی ہے کہ80 کی دہائی کے آخر تک پاکستان اپنے جی ڈی پی(یا مجموعی ملکی پیداوار) کا 7 فیصد دفاع پر خرچ کرتا تھا جو 90 اور 2000 کی دہائی میں کم کرکے 3.9 فیصد کردیا گیا اور مالی سال 2014 – 15 کے لئے تو دفاعی بجٹ کو مزید کم کرکے 2.4 فیصد کردیا گیا۔
  اس کے علاوہ یہ بھی واضح رہے کہ خطے میں پاکستان کا دفاعی بجٹ سب سے کم ہے۔ دنیا کے تمام ممالک کے دفاعی بجٹ پر بنی ہوئی ورلڈ بینک کی رپورٹ اٹھا کر دیکھ لیجئے۔ اندازہ ہو جائے گا کہ خطے میں پاکستان کا دفاعی بجٹ کیا ہے؟ ورلڈ بینک کی یہ رپورٹ جی ڈی پی کے حساب سے ملکوں کے دفاعی بجٹ کا فیصد بتاتی ہے اور یاد رکھئے گا کہ جن ملکوں کا ڈیٹا میں آپ کو بتاؤں گی ان کی ملکی معیشت کا حجم اور افراطِ زر کو بھی مدِ نظر رکھئے گا۔
• 2005 سے 2009 میں بھارت نے اپنا دفاعی بجٹ 2.8 فیصد سے بڑھا کر 2.9 فیصد تک کردیا۔ چین نے اپنا دفاعی بجٹ 2.0 فیصد سے بڑھا کر 2.2 فیصدکردیا جبکہ اس کے برعکس خطے میں پاکستان نے اپنی معیشت کے اعتبار سے اپنے دفاعی بجٹ میں کٹوتی کی اور اسے 4.2 فیصد سے 3.3 فیصد تک لے آیا۔ جبکہ اسی عرصے میں امریکہ نے بھی اپنے دفاعی بجٹ میں چین اور بھارت کی طرح اضافہ کیا اور اسے 3.8 فیصد سے 4.6 فیصد تک لے گیا۔
  80 کی دہائی کے آخر تک پاکستان اپنے جی ڈی پی (یا مجموعی ملکی پیداوار) کا 7 فیصد دفاع پر خرچ کرتا تھا جو90 اور 2000 کی دہائی میں کم کرکے 3.9 فیصد کردیا گیا اور مالی سال 2014-15 کے لئے تو دفاعی بجٹ کو مزید کم کرکے 2.4 فیصد کردیا گیا۔
  اب آجایئے 2010-2014 کے ڈیٹا پر۔ اس عرصے میں البتہ بھارت اور چین نے اپنے دفاعی بجٹ میں کمی کی اور پاکستان بھی پہلے کی طرح مستقل مزاجی کے ساتھ مسلسل اپنے دفاعی بجٹ میں کمی کرتا رہا۔ بھارت نے دفاعی بجٹ 2.1 فیصد تک کردیا۔ چین 2.7 فیصد سے 2.4 فیصد تک لے آیا۔ امریکہ نے بھی اپنے دفاعی بجٹ میں معمولی کمی کی اور اسے4.7 فیصد سے3.8 فیصد پر لے آیا۔لیکن اب پڑوسی ملک بھارت سے خبر ہے کہ وہ آئندہ مالی سال 2015-16 کے لئے اپنا دفاعی بجٹ 40 ارب ڈالر کی بھاری رقم تک بڑھا رہا ہے جو 2014-15 کے لئے 35ارب ڈالر تھی ! یہ اُس اضافی بجٹ سے علیٰحدہ ہے جسے اگر شامل کیا جائے تو انڈیا کا موجودہ دفاعی بجٹ46 ارب ڈالر سے زائد ہے۔
  بھارت پہلے ہی دنیا میں ہتھیاروں کا سب سے بڑا خریدار ہے۔ 2013 میں بھارت نے 6 ارب ڈالر ہتھیاروں کی خریداری پر خرچ کئے۔ بھارت کے بڑھتے ہوئے جنگی جنون اور اسرائیل کے ساتھ بڑھتے ہوئے دفاعی معاہدوں کی بنیاد پر ضرورت اس بات کی ہے کہ اس بحث کو فروغ دیا جائے کہ آیا پاکسان کو بھی اپنا دفاعی بجٹ اس سال بڑھانے کی ضرورت ہے یا نہیں؟؟ بحث میں اس حقیقت کو مدِ نظر رکھنا ہوگا کہ پاکستان میں دہشت گردوں کے خلاف کئی آپریشنز بھی چل رہے ہیں جو اپنی کامیابی کی طرف بڑھ رہے ہیں۔ ان آپریشنز کی کامیابی کی رفتار پر اختلاف یا بحث ہو سکتی ہے لیکن پاکستان میں کسی بھی شخص کو اس بات سے اختلاف نہیں کہ ان آپریشنز کو ہر حال میں کامیاب بنانا ہے ’’چاہے گھاس ہی کیوں نہ کھانی پڑے۔‘‘ یاد رہے یہ جملہ صرف محاورتاً استعمال ہوا ہے۔ اس کے علاوہ ’’را‘‘ کی سرگرمیاں پاکستان میں بڑھتی جارہی ہیں۔ ان کا سدِ باب کرنے کے لئے بھی دفاعی بجٹ کی ضرورت ہے۔
  میرا ذاتی خیال ہے کہ آئندہ مالی سال 2015-16 کے لئے دفاعی بجٹ میں اضافہ ناگزیر ہے۔ اس اضافے کی مقدار کیا ہونی چاہئے‘ اس پر بحث لازم ہے اور میرا خیال ہے کہ متعلقہ حلقوں میں یہ بحث رواں ہوگی اور آخر میں حتمی فیصلہ قومی اسمبلی کی بجٹ بحث میں ہوگا۔ لیکن اس کے ساتھ میری توقع یہ بھی ہے کہ تعلیم‘ صحت اور ترقیاتی اخراجات میں بھی مناسب اضافہ کیا جائے گا اور اس اضافے کے درست اور شفاف استعمال کو بھی یقینی بنایا جائے گا تاکہ اس کی آڑ میں ملک کے دفاعی بجٹ کے متعلق غلط فہمی کو ہوا نہ دی جاسکے۔ آخر میں مجھے یقین ہے کہ میری اس تحریر کے ذریعے بہت سے لوگ جو دفاعی بجٹ کے متعلق نہیں جانتے تھے‘ اب جان چکے ہوں گے اور اپنے شعور ادراک کے دروازوں کو تحقیق کے لئے کھلا رکھیں گے۔
  مزید پڑھیں
  http://hilal.gov.pk/index.php/layouts/item/1523-2015-07-27-05-44-55
• ڈیفنس بجٹ-3
• غلط فہمی پیدا کی جا رہی ہے ”کہ سارا بجٹ فوج کھا گئی“ ہمارے بجٹ پر تنقید کی بجائے دوسرے اداروں کیلئے مختص رقم کے استعمال کا طریقہ درست کیا جائے :
  فوج حکومت وقت کی پالیسیوں کے مطابق کام کرتی ہے، فوج کی تعداد کا تعین کرنا حکومت اورعوام کا کام ہے دشمن کی دفاعی صلاحیتوں کے مطابق فوج کو تیاری کرنا پڑتی ہے، فوجی بجٹ پر تنقید کی بجائے دیگر اداروں کے بجٹ کے استعمال کا طریقہ کار درست کیا جائے، دفاعی فوجی بجٹ دنیا کی کوئی بھی فوج منظر عام پر نہیں لاسکتی اگر سویلین قیادت سمجھتی ہے کہ بھارت کے ساتھ خطرات کو بات چیت کے ذریعے کم کیا جا سکتا ہے تو فوج کی تعداد اور اخراجات بھی کم کئے جا سکتے ہیں۔ ایک نجی ٹی وی سے گفتگو کرتے ہوئے ترجمان پاک فوج نے کہا کہ دشمن ممالک کی ایجنسیز کا یہ ٹارگٹ ہے کہ فوج اور عوام میں خلاءپیدا کیا جائے اور فوج کو تنقید کا نشانہ بنا کر یہ ثابت کرنے کی کوشش کی جائے کہ فوج ملک اور عوام کی ترقی کے لئے بڑا بوجھ ہے ایسی سازش کے ذریعے مختلف طریقوں سے خبریں پھیلائی جاتی ہیں کہ فوج کے اخراجات زیادہ ہیں اگر یہ اخراجات نہ ہوں تو عوام اور ملک ترقی کرنے کے علاوہ عوام خوشحال ہو جائیں، دشمن ممالک کی یہ سازش اپنی جگہ لیکن حقیقت یہ ہے کہ فوج جو بھی حکومت ہوتی ہے اس کی پالیسی کے مطابق کام کرتی ہے، یہ فیصلہ عوام اور حکومت نے کرنا ہوتا ہے کہ ملک کو کیا خطرات درپیش ہیں اور ان کے پیش نظر کتنی فوج ہونی چاہیے ،فوج اپنی طرف سے یہ فیصلہ نہیں کرتی کہ اس کی کیا تعداد ہونی چاہیے فوج کا کام یہ ہے کہ وہ خطرات کا جائزہ لینے کے بعد اپنے تجربات حکومت وقت کو دیتی ہے پھر حکومت اس حوالے سے فیصلہ کرتی ہے فوج کا بجٹ دو حصوں پر مشتمل ہوتا ہے، ایک حصہ مینٹننس بجٹ کا ہوتا ہے جو اولین ہوتا ہے اس پر ہر قسم کی بحث ہو سکتی ہے، دوسرا ڈویلپمنٹ بجٹ ہوتا ہے، دنیا کی کوئی بھی فوج اپنا ڈویلپمنٹ بجٹ کسی کو نہیں بتاتی نہ اس پر بحث ہوتی ہے چونکہ اس سے دشمن کو یہ اندازہ ہو جاتا ہے کہ ڈویلپمنٹ کن اداروں اور کن ایریاز میں ہو رہی ہے لہذا اس بجٹ کو خفیہ رکھا جاتا ہے جہاں تک ”فیکٹس اینڈ فگر“ کا تعلق ہے تو موجودہ صورت حال کے مطابق گزشتہ دس سال کے بجٹ کا تجربہ کیا جائے تو فوج کا بجٹ شرح کے اعتبار سے نیچے آیا ہے اس وقت فوج کا بجٹ فوجی بجٹ کے تناسب سے 14 فیصد ہے اور اس سے متعلق غلط فہمی پیدا کی جاتی ہے کہ یہ 40 فیصد ہے اور سارا بجٹ فوج کھا گئی ، میجر جنرل اطہر عباس نے کہا کہ کیا فوج کے علاوہ دوسرے اداروں اور شعبہ جات کے لئے جو بجٹ مختص کیا جاتا ہے وہ 100 فیصد درست استعمال ہوتا ہے انہوں نے کہا کہ پنجاب میں جعلی سکولوں کے بارے میں فوج نے مکمل طور پر ایک رپورٹ پیش کی تھی اتنے ہزار جعلی سکولز اور جعلی اساتذہ موجود ہیں ان سے متعلق کہا گیا کہ وہ تمام نظام درست کر لیا گیا ہے اگر بھارت کے بجٹ کا جائزہ لیا جائے تو اس وقت بھارتی فوج کا بجٹ 36 بلین ڈالر جبکہ پاک فوج کا بجٹ چار بلین ڈالر سے بھی کم ہے ہم نے دیکھنا ہے کہ ہمارا دشمن کتنا طاقتور ہے اور اس کی جنگی صلاحیت کیا ہے اسی کے مطابق اپنی تیاری کرتے ہیں، یہ نہیں دیکھا جاتا کہ موجودہ حالات اور کشیدگی کی صورت حال کیا ہے چونکہ حالات تبدیل ہوتے رہتے ہیں ہم یہ دیکھتے ہیں کہ وہ کس قسم کے ہتھیار تیار کررہے ہیں ان تمام چیزوں کو مدنظر رکھتے ہوئے دفاعی اخراجات اور دفاعی صلاحیت کو بڑھایا جاتا ہے۔ ہم رفتہ رفتہ اس بات کا جائزہ لیتے رہتے ہیں کہ دوسرے اداروں کا بجٹ کیا ہے لیکن سوال یہ پیدا ہوتا ہے کہ کیا جن دوسرے اداروں اور شعبہ جات کے لئے جو بجٹ مختص کیا جاتا ہے اس کا استعمال درست انداز میں ہوتا ہے اگر کسی ادارے کا بجٹ مختص ہے اور اس میں سے بھی بجٹ پر تنقید کرنے کے بجائے بہتر ہے مختص ہونے کے باوجود جن اداروں کا بجٹ کا پورا حصہ استعمال نہیں ہوتا اس کی کیا وجہ ہے جو سویلین قیادت یہ سمجھتی ہے کہ پاکستان کو درپیش خطرات کو کسی طریقے سے حل کیا جا سکتا ہے تو فوج کو بھی کم کیا جا سکتا ہے جب قیادت محسوس کرتی ہے کہ بھارت کے ساتھ بات چیت کے ذریعے خطرات کو کم کیا جا سکتا ہے تو ان خطرات کو کم کیا جائے اور اس کے مطابق اپنے دفاع کا سائز رکھا جائے یہ سارا فیصلہ عوام اور حکومت نے کرنا ہوتا ہے
  http://www.nawaiwaqt.com.pk/national/14-Mar-2011/69812

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